In this post, I will summarize the approach used in the
System Dynamics Model of Defence and the Canadian Economy. Then I will provide some findings for Defence
expenditure for three threat scenarios.
Finally, I will provide the results for all of the sectors in the
economy.
The processes in the model of Defence and the economy can be summarized by the figure below. The need for Defence is modified by shocking the system through changes to the Defence per capita normal. The discrepancy between the current Defence per capita in the model and the Defence per capita normal creates a pressure on the need for Defence.
The processes in the model of Defence and the economy can be summarized by the figure below. The need for Defence is modified by shocking the system through changes to the Defence per capita normal. The discrepancy between the current Defence per capita in the model and the Defence per capita normal creates a pressure on the need for Defence.
If the Defence per capita is less than the Defence per capita normal, such as after September 11th, 2001, then the need for Defence will increase.
If the need for Defence increases the desired expenditure on Defence increases and the "desired" expenditure on labour, capital and resources for Defence will increase.
This leads to actual increases in labour, capital and
resources devoted to Defence and thereby allows the production of Defence to
increase.
When Defence production increases, the Defence per capita
increases and the discrepancy between the Defence per capita and Defence per
capita normal decreases. So the need for
Defence will decrease.
Therefore, these are balancing or goal seeking loops in the
language of System Dynamics.
Of course, if the Defence per capita is greater than the
Defence per capita normal, such as at the end of the Cold War, then the
relationships would work in the opposite direction and the desired expenditure
on Defence and the Defence production would decrease.
The figure below shows the results from the model in terms
of Defence expenditure for three scenarios.
The first scenario (the yellow curve) is the counter-factual situation in which there was no terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001. We can see that the Defence budget is still assumed to increase because of an increase in the population of Canada.
The second scenario (the purple curve) mimics reality in
which there was an increased need for Defence after September 11th, 2001 and
that this period of increase need continued until the end of Canada's combat commitment in Afghanistan. The the need for Defence returned to a lower
lever after 2012. We can see that the
Defence expenditure gradually increases and then reaches a higher steady-state
than the counter-factual.
The final scenario that was examined (the blue curve) was a
continued state of higher tension that resulted in a higher need for Defence
indefinitely. In this case, Defence is
believed to require continually increasing investment.
Preliminary findings for all of the sectors of the economy
shown in the figure below suggest that the economy will be dominated by the
private services sector which will continue to increase for the next 50
years. The other sectors of the economy
are predicted to reach a steady-state around 2060.
The results from the model suggest that increased Defence expenditure will have little or no impact on total gross domestic product of the nation in the short-term. Continuing increases in Defence expenditure will have a positive effect on the gross domestic product of the nation in the long-term but the effect is believed to be relatively marginal.
The results from the model appear to show that increased
Defence expenditure will not "crowd out" development in other sectors
because there is inherent slack in the economy to draw additional resources for
Defence.
These results seem realistic to me. I believe that Defence is a small part of the
Canadian economy and changes in Defence expenditure within the expected ranges
will neither hurt nor aid the economy to a significant effect. This is a somewhat negative result from the
point of view of proponents for increased Defence expenditure.
One of the novel concepts provided by this model is Defence
per capita as a measure of the appropriate expenditure on Defence. The usual measure in Defence economics is
Defence expenditure as a percent of GDP.
Defence as a percentage of GDP implies that richer countries
will spend more to defend themselves than poorer countries. The threats faced
by a country are not directly considered.
Instead, the idea might be that rich countries have more to lose from
outside threats and therefore spend more on Defence to protect their assets.
As an alternative, in our model, the gap between Defence per
capita and Normal Defence per capita suggests that the Defence expenditure
would be based on the population's perception of the threats to their
lives. That is, citizens in countries
with significant perceptions of threats to their lives would be willing to
spend more per capita than countries with less of a perception of threat to
their lives. This might better explain
why Canada
spends relatively little on Defence; namely, because Canadians do not feel
their lives are being threatened.
On this note, I retired from the Defence Research and
Development Agency.